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29 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Board Requirements on the NRO

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. The Board, or COMOR on its behalf, has submitted a great number of requirements to the NRO. These include targeting and requests bearing upon scheduling and the number of J and ☐ missions, at various times, such as on the problem of coverage of China. The actions of the Board and COMOR on these questions are extensive and documented.
3. The Board has approved two major requirements statements which have been transmitted to the NRO recently.
  - a. Long-Range Requirements for Satellite Photographic Collection (USIB-D-41.13/11; COMOR-D-13/16) on 31 July 1964, which recommended a single capability for search and surveillance with continuous stereoscopic ground coverage equivalent to J and a resolution equivalent to ☐ as well as a capability to permit interpretation of details on the

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NRO Review Completed.

  
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b. A statement on 10 September 1964 on Current Satellite  Requirements was comprehensive in scope but geared within the state-of-the-art as advised by the NRO (USIB-D-41. 14/186; COMOR-D-69/15).

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4. In addition there were the following actions:

a. On 6 February 1963, the Board approved COMOR recommendations regarding satellite scheduling with instructions to the NRO [see Tab A (USIB-D-41. 14/7 Final USIB-Approved; COMOR-D-48/21)].

b. A COMOR study submitted to the Board on 20 September was removed from the agenda by direction of the DCI [see Tab B (USIB-D-41. 15/17; COMOR-D-48/45)].


c. On 14 November 1963, the Board concurred with the Chairman's proposal that the schedule presented by the NRO was satisfactory. However, the NRO charts used in its presentation to the Board were not published [see Tab C (USIB-D-41. 15/22; COMOR-D-48/52)].

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d. On 10 September 1964, the Board urged NRO to maintain a crisis standby capability [redacted] [see Tab D (USIB-D-41.15/42; COMOR-D-48/91)].

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**Chairman**  
**Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance**

**Attachments w/original only**

**Tab A**  
**Tab B**  
**Tab C**  
**Tab D**


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	<b>2</b>	<b>DDCI</b>
	<b>3</b>	<b>ExSec/USIB</b>
	<b>4</b>	<b>DDI</b>
	<b>5</b>	<b>DDI</b> [redacted]
	<b>6</b>	<b>DDS&amp;T</b>
	<b>7</b>	<b>SA(COMOR)/DDS&amp;T</b>
	<b>8</b>	<b>SA(COMOR)/DDS&amp;T</b>
	<b>9</b>	<b>SA(COMOR)/DDS&amp;T</b>
	<b>10</b>	<b>SA(COMOR)/DDS&amp;T</b>

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